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“Making it Worse than What really 
Happened”: social chaos and 
Preparedness as Problematic 
Mythologies in Disaster 
communication
Natalie D. Baker*
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This perspective piece explores both social chaos and disaster preparedness as mythol-
ogies that are a persistent part of problems with disaster communication. It argues that 
while extant scholarship acknowledges disaster myths that advance the belief that social 
chaos and, for example, looting is common is problematic, there has not been much 
done to mitigate this in practice. Furthermore, the continued focus on social disorder 
in institutional efforts does not recognize inherent skills and capabilities of citizens both 
at risk for and affected by disaster. Here, I argue that the concept of preparedness 
is an expectation that dichotomizes human behavior and is a form of social control. 
Those who are not prepared according to institutional norms have the potential to be 
unruly. The management of large emergencies must mitigate myths and advance more 
accurate understandings of prosociality in disasters. To this end, the status quo commu-
nicates bad information about human behavior in crisis that perpetuates a paternalistic 
institutional approach that stagnates equitable disaster management. Here, I pose a call 
for new directions in disaster research given such issues.
Keywords: disaster myths, disaster management, disaster communication, social chaos, disaster preparedness, 
social control
On September 11th, 2001, as hundreds of thousands fled south from the burning tow-
ers, people quickly discovered something we often forget: that Manhattan is an island. As 
officials closed all bridges, tunnels and commuter lines linking Manhattan to the rest of 
the world, people were trapped. The little told story of what happened next is the focus of 
my documentary short film, BOATLIFT, narrated by Tom Hanks. The film premiered at 
the Center for National Policy’s 9/11 Ten Year Anniversary Summit, in Washington, D.C. 
BOATLIFT is the story of the largest maritime evacuation in history. On 9/11, over 500,000 
people were rescued from Manhattan’s seawalls in just nine hours. How did this happen? 
What heroism made this possible? The answer lies in the resilience of the everyday people 
at the scene that day, and the brave community of mariners who ply the waters of New 
York’s Harbor (Rosenstein, 2011).
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the massive boatlift described in the selection 
from the Huffington Post above was spontaneously organized by both mariners and officials who 
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were determined to get people off Manhattan. This film shows 
some pretty remarkable, but also common actions undertaken by 
mostly ordinary citizens in the aftermath of disaster. BOATLIFT 
provides evidence, at least in this instance, that social chaos was 
not characteristic of public response after the attacks. Despite 
such prosocial acts documented during 9-11 by some scholars 
[see Wachtendorf (2004) and Wachtendorf and Kendra (2006)] 
and in the BOATLIFT documentary, treatment by politicians and 
media focused on the sensationalistic elements of this horrific 
event. This galvanized a collective sense of nationalism, rather 
than a focus on heroism. Why did we not hear about the boatlift 
in news after the attacks?
Similarly, the post-Katrina aftermath and response by citizens 
was positioned as social chaos by politicians, media, and even 
victims. Here, we heard much about depraved conditions, par-
ticularly among the most disadvantaged:
Appearing on “Oprah” on Sept. 6. Chief Eddie Compass 
said of the Superdome: “We had little babies in there, 
some of the little babies getting raped.” Mayor C. Ray 
Nagin concurred: “They have people standing out 
there, have been in the frickin’ Superdome for five 
days watching dead bodies, watching hooligans kill-
ing people, raping people.” But the night before, Chief 
Compass had told The Guardian, “We don’t have any 
substantiated rapes. We will investigate if they come 
forward.” Many of the more toxic rumors seem to 
have come from evacuees, half-crazed with fear sitting 
through night after night in the dark. Victims, officials, 
and reporters all took one of the most horrific events 
in American history and made it worse than it actually 
was. Although I was not in New Orleans, I was at the 
World Trade Center towers site the afternoon of Sept. 
11, 2001. People had seen unimaginable things, but a 
small percentage, many still covered in ash, told me 
tales that were worse than what actually happened. 
Mothers throwing babies out of the towers, men getting 
in fights on the ledges, human heads getting blown out 
of the buildings, all of which took place so high up in 
the air that it was hard to distinguish the falling humans 
from the falling wreckage (Carr, 2005).
As alluded to in the selection above, the portrayal of 
human behavior in disasters such as Katrina, and even 9-11, 
as chaotic, violent, animalist, barbaric, and so on [see Tyson 
(2005), for example] are greatly exaggerated and/or patently 
false (Tierney et al., 2006; Sun, 2011, 2012). Yet, during both 
9-11 and Katrina, publics and institutions were preoccupied 
with the spectacle and drama of these disasters. While the 
attack in New York was very real, so was the boatlift. On the 
other hand, looting reported during Katrina was arguably 
imagined (Tierney et  al., 2006), but actions such as citizen-
based rescues, even among the poor Blacks of the city who 
were likened to animals, hooligans, and thugs were also very 
real (Rodriguez et al., 2006). The federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina in direct relationship to the reports of chaos resulted 
in rescue-based efforts being suspended for more combat-like 
approaches to response where everyday citizens were held at 
gunpoint by members of their own military. One only need 
look to the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids policing actions 
of most military with regard to the US public (Greenberger and 
Spaccarelli, 2010) to understand such actions as problematic. 
Yes, during Katrina, a particular selection of American citizens 
was treated as enemy combatants by members of the military. 
It is the duty of disaster scholars and managers to make sure 
this never happens again, and continue to ask what it is about 
US society that permitted this.
One answer is that societal projections of social chaos in 
disasters through mediums, such as Hollywood, news, rumors, 
and exaggerations, advance the idea that this is a fundamental 
feature of such events. Such medium advances the notion that 
publics are unruly. I do not suggest they cause mythologies to 
perpetuate rather they reflect and constitute them. As one of 
my research participants in an on-going and not-yet-published 
project on journalists in hostile environments puts it, “we are 
the media and the media is us.” Thus, American society bears 
some responsibility because of preferences, values, and prac-
tices embedded within these outputs. For example, hyperbolic 
portrayals of threat sell stories about large-scale disasters or 
potential crises that tap into societal values such as nationalism 
(Baker et al., 2015) or resonate with a preference for narratives 
of “good versus evil” (Cottle, 2006). Indeed, the structure of the 
post-9-11 emergency management system is headed to a more 
militarized form (Tierney and Bevc, 2007; Masco, 2014; Sun and 
Jones, 2015), where dealing with the imagined threat of a “bad” 
unruly populace is a major priority to be dealt with by “good” 
management systems, even though this is largely mythological. 
Disaster institutions have bought into, and perpetuate these 
mythologies.
Here, I am explicit in putting forward the dangers of the 
continued advancement of such misunderstandings of human 
behavior in the midst of crisis because it both contradicts knowl-
edge about response and creates room for marginalization as 
seen in Katrina. We know that people respond in flexible (Baker 
et  al., 2012), improvisational (Wachtendorf, 2004; Kendra and 
Wachtendorf, 2006), and ultimately prosocial ways (Solnit, 2010) 
during crisis events. People have the capacity to organize and act 
heroically in the absence of formal plans, or emergency respond-
ers [see, for example, Dynes (1990)]. It has even been suggested 
that emergent, prosocial behavior without preparation is equally 
as important planning and preparedness activities (Kendra and 
Wachtendorf, 2006) advanced by management institutions as 
fundamental to response. Yet, the institution of disaster manage-
ment continues to treat publics either as threats, or complacent 
despite much evidence to the contrary. The institutional norm of 
preparedness partly advances such notions of the public. This is 
explained in detail below.
The current state of mainstream disaster research and practice, 
with some exception, tends to focus on the creation of a “prepar-
edness culture” to ensure populations at risk are able to respond 
in disasters. On the surface, preparedness is a way that publics can 
take personal responsibility for building resilience in response to 
the potentiality of crisis (Paton, 2001, 2003; Tierney et al., 2001), 
aid in recovery (Diekman et al., 2007), and decrease vulnerability 
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(Becker et al., 2012, 2013). Preparedness is built on an assumption 
that if people prepare they should be able to “bounce back” after 
a disaster. But is this really the case?
There are some scholars who question the above assump-
tion. For example, Baker (2014a,b) argues the expectation of 
preparedness idealizes compliance to institutional preparedness 
directives (e.g., collecting supplies and making plans), whereas 
public reflections demonstrate self-organization and prosociality. 
Thus, people have problems engaging in preparedness efforts as 
told because (1) the notion of an impending disaster does not 
fit in with their experience of reality as stable and (2) they have 
confidence in their ability to make it through a disaster despite 
a lack of preparedness efforts. For the most part, they trust their 
existing skills, abilities, and resources to help them recover in 
even the most disruptive situations (Baker, 2014a). However, 
the belief that vulnerable publics can take matters in their own 
hands in the instance of disaster without previous preparation, is 
threatening to emergency management.
Recent research suggests that the institutional notion of disas-
ter preparedness, while indeed intended to help keep people safe, 
is also about controlling publics which are viewed as potential 
threats. Baker and Grant Ludwig (2016) theorize based on 
empirical research that preparedness is an expectation embedded 
within the militarizing structures of US emergency management 
and is a form of social control. Preparedness, as a concept, is built 
on an assumption that the creation of plans and collection of sup-
plies is necessary to “bounce back,” whereas at-risk publics tend 
to believe they can respond in the immediacy of the moment. 
The fact that people negotiate disasters through adaptation and 
without preparedness has been established in extant scholarship. 
When confronted with this, emergency management becomes 
uncomfortable. Baker and Grant Ludwig (2016) show unprepared 
publics that trust their ability respond are viewed threatening, 
prone to panic, and ultimately a source of social chaos. A prepared 
public is compliant, safe, and controlled. A public that responds 
to the immediacy of the situation, as is natural, is a source of 
“social chaos” that disaster management institutions fear, but also 
require to perpetuate their very existence. If it is the case that 
publics are perpetuated as unruly threats through mythology, 
is the prepared public according to institutional standards also 
a myth? I argue this is a major roadblock to equitable disaster 
management and communication efforts, as well as the mitiga-
tion of disaster mythology.
cONcLUsiON
Preparedness is an almost universal expectation in emergency 
management. But as Evans and Reid (2014), p. 10, warn, “Be deeply 
suspicious of anything that masks itself in universal regalia. Bring 
into question that which is not being questioned in the normal 
state of affairs.” This is our task to take to heart if we really want 
to advance our collective understandings of disasters. Much of 
the current state of disaster research and emergency management 
practice, particularly in the area of preparedness, dichotomizes 
behavior into categories such as “prepared or not.” It is an easy 
leap from not prepared, to complacent, and then to unruly, 
particularly for those populations who are already pigeonholed 
as such (e.g., black, poor New Orleanians during Katrina). These 
dichotomizations both stagnate progress and create spaces for 
inequity and myth. Furthermore, social scientists know that the 
world of human behavior is incredibly dynamic and nuanced. 
Such black and white conceptualizations contradict what we see 
in response efforts on the ground in many disaster cases. Context 
matters deeply, yet is virtually ignored in the emergency manage-
ment world.
The problematizations I pose are rooted in issues of the 
communication of mythologies and expectations of disaster 
management institutions. How then can human communication 
be improved in the advancement of better, particularly more 
equitable disaster management? Furthermore, we should ask, 
what does better disaster management mean if we destroy or take 
into question our myths and universals? Unfortunately, I do not 
have these answers. As a social scientist, one of the issues that 
keeps me employed is that human beings are messy. Perhaps the 
better question to ask is what are the new problems we can work 
on together, outside of what is currently being done?
One-dimensional approaches to disasters that advance the idea 
of preparedness as the absolute answer to successful responses, 
whatever that means, feed into the assumptions that publics are 
apathetic, threatening, and or helpless. We must take to task why 
there is an almost religious belief that preparedness is the key to 
successful response. We must provide clear causal links between 
preparedness efforts and successful response, or study why this 
is advanced as the only answer. If there are weak connections, 
we need to research the context of disasters, rather than how to 
make people prepare better. We need to ask and understand how 
we can allow for the potential that clearly exists in most everyone 
to grow, rather than ignore or punish it in the case of a lack of 
adherence to institutional directives. The first step is to explicitly 
acknowledge our inherent problems with both expectations and 
communication, as in the case of a continued perpetuation of 
disaster myths such as lawlessness or panicked publics that evoke 
a need to “govern,” but actually bloat understandings of human 
behavioral response realities as worse than they actually are. It 
is our collective task as those invested in the management of 
crisis to understand, identify, and draw upon the potentials of 
the public in the advancement of more human, equitable disaster 
negotiation rather than uphold a paternalistic status quo rife with 
problems and anti-democratic approaches. We will experience 
more boatlifts in the future.
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